




























Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Woods, A. (2011). A historical synopsis of farm animal disease and public policy in twentieth century Britain.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 366(1573), 1943-1954.
10.1098/rstb.2010.0388
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0388




in twentieth century Britain





 Article cited in:
 
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1573/1943.full.html#ref-list-1
 This article cites 43 articles, 4 of which can be accessed free
Subject collections
 (462 articles)health and disease and epidemiology   
 
Articles on similar topics can be found in the following collections
Email alerting service
 hereright-hand corner of the article or click 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article - sign up in the box at the top
 http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/subscriptions go to: Phil. Trans. R. Soc. BTo subscribe to 
This journal is © 2011 The Royal Society
 on May 30, 2011rstb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 
Research
A historical synopsis of farm animal disease
and public policy in twentieth century
Britain
Abigail Woods*
Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, Level 2, Central Library, Imperial College
London South Kensington Campus, London SW7 2AZ, UK
The diseases suffered by British livestock, and the ways in which they were perceived and managed
by farmers, vets and the state, changed considerably over the course of the twentieth century. This
paper documents and analyses these changes in relation to the development of public policy. It
reveals that scientific knowledge and disease demographics cannot by themselves explain the shift-
ing boundaries of state responsibility for animal health, the diseases targeted and the preferred
modes of intervention. Policies were shaped also by concerns over food security and the public’s
health, the state of the national and livestock economy, the interests and expertise of the veterinary
profession, and prevailing agricultural policy. This paper demonstrates how, by precipitating changes
to farming and trading practices, public policy could sometimes actually undermine farm animal
health. Animal disease can therefore be viewed both as a stimulus to, and a consequence of, twentieth
century public policy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The diseases suffered by British livestock, and the ways
in which they were perceived and managed by farmers,
vets and the state, changed considerably over the course
of the twentieth century. This paper documents and
analyses these changes in relation to the development
of public policy. It examines and explains the shifting
boundaries of state responsibility for animal health,
the diseases targeted and the preferred modes of inter-
vention. It also demonstrates how, by precipitating
changes to farming and trading practices, public
policy could sometimes undermine animal health.
In keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of this
theme issue, this paper regards disease both as a bio-
logical event caused by particular micro-organisms
and pathological processes, and as a social phenomenon
that ‘does not exist until we have agreed that it does, by
perceiving, naming and responding to it’ [1]. This
approach differs from that of the two existing, book-
length historical synoptic accounts, which regard
policy either as a self-evident response to a scientifically
defined disease problem [2], or as an intervention driven
by society and politics rather than the characteristics of
the disease in question [3]. In accepting that diseases
have a ‘real’ existence whose understanding is mediated
by society, culture, economics and politics, the inte-
grated analysis presented here expands upon Brassley’s
claim that disease ‘perceptions may have more effect
than the pathogens on the policies’ [4]. It reveals that
while policy responses were shaped partly by disease
demographics and scientific understandings, they can
only be fully understood by examining the context in
which diseases emerged, were made visible, and were
constructed as pressing problems in need of state-led
solutions.
Owing to restrictions on length, a comprehensive
treatment of animal disease and public policy is not
possible. This paper, therefore, focuses on the more
important diseases of cattle, sheep and pigs in twenti-
eth century Britain. ‘Importance’ is judged mainly
from an animal health, not a public health perspective.
Of the food-borne zoonoses, only bovine tuberculosis
(bTB) and brucellosis are addressed. No attempt has
been made to examine poultry disease or animal
welfare policy, and twenty-first century developments
such as the growing controversy over bTB
control and the movement for farm health planning,
are not discussed. However, an effort has been made
to push beyond the disease eradication campaigns
examined by existing literature to consider other,
rarely documented forms of state intervention in
livestock health.
Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, §2
explores the shift in focus of animal health policy,
from the stamping out of foreign epizootic diseases to
the detection and control of major endemic diseases.
Moving to the inter-war period, §3 shows how animal
health and policy responses to it were shaped by finan-
cial stringency, the politics ofmilk consumption and the
reorganization of livestock marketing. Section 4 reveals
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that the wartime drive to maximize meat and milk
output focused the state’s attention on disease as a
cause of inefficient production, and led to new forms of
veterinary intervention on dairy and hill sheep farms.
Post-war, as shown in §5, there was a further shift in
the nature and range of veterinary intervention. The
state’s commitment to greater and more efficient food
production, and the health problems generated as agri-
culture intensified, resulted in national disease
eradication campaigns and attempts, at farm level, to
prevent the diseases of production. Towards the end of
the century, ample food supplies and the escalating
costs of agricultural support caused the state to roll
back its investment in animal health. Section 6 reveals
how this policy, and the continuing intensification
of agriculture, left the nation vulnerable to new and
resurgent infections, such as bovine spongiform ence-
phalopathy (BSE) and foot and mouth disease (FMD).
This paper concludes (§7) with some reflections on the
relationship between animal health and public policy.
2. FROM ELIMINATION TO CONTROL,
ca 1900–1920
At the turn of the twentieth century, members of the
Veterinary Department of the Board of Agriculture1
were in a buoyant mood [6]. Over the previous
60 years, the nation had suffered a series of invasions
by costly contagious animal diseases. The liberaliza-
tion of the international livestock trade that followed
the 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws, the development
of steamships and railways, and the nutritional
demands of a growing, increasingly urbanized popu-
lation, had contributed to the problem by enabling
and encouraging livestock to be moved further, faster
and more frequently than ever before [7]. State vets
had fought a long and difficult battle to prevent the
entry and spread of these epizootic diseases,2 which
by 1900 they appeared to have won [2].
Sheep pox, whose 1847 appearance had inspired
the first legislative interventions in animal health,
had not been seen since 1862. The highly fatal and
contagious rinderpest, or cattle plague, whose ravages
had prompted the 1865 formation of a State Veterin-
ary Department (SVD), had last invaded in 1878.
FMD (which appeared in 1839) and bovine pleuro-
pneumonia (1842), whose endemic status and evasion
of disease controls had provoked successive expansions
in the size, scope and power of the SVD, disappeared
in 1886 and 1898, respectively. Although, FMD reap-
peared briefly in 1892 and 1900 it was quickly
eliminated. Of the major known livestock diseases,
only swine fever and sheep scab remained resistant to
the SVD’s interventions [2,8–11].
These achievements enhanced the legitimacy of the
Veterinary Department’s policy of ‘stamping out’ dis-
ease. Applied first to cattle plague and then extended
to the other epizootic diseases (apart from sheep
scab, which was controlled by dipping), this policy
aimed to prevent the invasion and spread of disease,
and eliminate it from the nation. Measures included:
restrictions on the importation and movement of live-
stock, and the compulsory slaughter or quarantine of
affected animals and their contacts. Much resistance
accompanied the introduction and extension of stamp-
ing out. However, the SVD, supported by powerful
aristocratic cattle breeders, believed that the national
benefits outweighed the local and individual costs.
Consequently, it continued, throughout the twentieth
century, to apply stamping out to the only epizootic
disease that remained a problem: FMD. This reap-
peared virtually every year until 1968, causing major
epidemics in 1922–1923, 1923–1924, 1951–1952
and 1967–1968 [9,10,12].
With the disappearance of epizootic disease, the
Veterinary Department turned its attention to two
endemic, widespread and costly cattle diseases that it
judged to be of national importance. bTB and conta-
gious abortion (later known as brucellosis) were of
particular concern to dairy farmers and aristocratic
pedigree cattle breeders, who used their political influ-
ence and social connections to lobby for state action.
bTB was a chronic, debilitating disease that under-
mined meat and milk production. Despite Robert
Koch’s 1901 statement to the contrary, it was believed
to spread to humans via the meat and milk of infected
cows (an issue that was considered by three Royal
Commissions sitting between 1890 and 1911). Conta-
gious abortion caused widespread abortion within
herds, leading to the loss of valuable calves and milk
[13,14]. Like bTB, it appeared to be increasing in
prevalence, possibly due to the growing demand for
milk, which induced arable farmers affected by the
late nineteenth century agricultural depression to
turn increasingly to dairying [2,7,15].3
Controlling bTB and brucellosis posed quite differ-
ent political and technical challenges to the nineteenth
century epizootics. These were not foreign invaders
but familiar, endemic diseases which many farmers
tolerated. The clinical signs of bTB (emaciation,
coughing and an indurated udder) did not appear
until disease was relatively advanced, while cows
infected with brucellosis could not be identified
except in the act of abortion. Consequently, stamping
out—which relied on the rapid identification of disease
in order to eliminate it before it had a chance to
spread—could not be applied. Instead, for both dis-
eases, and for the ongoing problem of swine fever
(which was proving difficult to diagnose clinically
and by post-mortem), state vets sought improved
methods of diagnosis within the laboratory. Formerly,
they had taken little interest in research owing to their
faith in stamping out. Now, however, they viewed it as
a way of making stamping out possible. Their investi-
gations also served a professional purpose. In the late
1890s, administrative civil servants had taken over
from state vets the responsibility for making and—to
a large extent—delivering animal health policy. By
undertaking laboratory investigations into disease,
state vets sought to assert the ‘veterinary’ and ‘scien-
tific’ as opposed to the ‘policing’ nature of livestock
disease control, and therefore the need to restore
veterinary direction of policy [11,12,14,17].
Research performed under the Board of Agriculture
confirmed that tuberculin—discovered by Koch in
1890—was an effective method of bTB diagnosis. It
also resulted in a diagnostic blood test for brucellosis.
Unfortunately, hopes that these methods would
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facilitate stamping out were not fulfilled as their appli-
cation revealed the diseases to be far more
widespread—and hence more difficult and expensive
to eliminate—than originally anticipated. Up to a
quarter of the national herd was infected. One alter-
native to stamping out was for farmers to attempt,
voluntarily, to eliminate disease from their herds by
first testing and identifying, then isolating and even-
tually disposing of infected cows. However, doubts
surrounding diagnostic accuracy, and the time, cost
and facilities required, meant that only a handful of
livestock owners were prepared to adopt this practice.
Of those that agreed to testing, many found it easier
to send reacting cattle to market than to isolate
them. Consequently, as well as curtailing disease, the
tests contributed to its spread [14,17–19].
The 1909 discovery of a brucellosis vaccine elevated
hopes of controlling infection. However, evidence of
its efficacy in the field proved impossible to collect.
Consequently, it was not incorporated into policy,
though farmers who wished to pay for it could
obtain supplies via their veterinary surgeon. More suc-
cess was achieved with another laboratory product,
swine fever serum. World War I (WWI) cut off supplies
of Danish pork and bacon. It also created a shortage of
cereal used for pig feeding, causing the British pig herd
to shrink by 64 per cent over the course of the war
[20]. In order to preserve the pig population, the
SVD suspended stamping out for swine fever, and
instead applied serum to potentially infected pigs.
This policy was successful in reducing pig mortality
and morbidity. However, it failed to stop disease
spreading. Consequently, with the post-war economic
crisis and resurgence in pig numbers, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) introduced
in 1922 a policy of isolating sick pigs and their con-
tacts. Owners could still request serum, but at their
own expense [2,11,14].
In this way, the SVD transferred its laboratory-
generated methods of bTB, brucellosis and swine
fever control to the private domain. Falling back on
its traditional, legislative interventions, it introduced
some piecemeal and largely ineffective measures. A
1909 Order for bTB control enabled local authorities
to institute a system—already applied by some pro-
gressive boroughs—of veterinary inspection and the
enforced removal of clinically affected cows. Justified
on the grounds that it would limit contamination of
the milk supply, if not the spread of disease among
cattle, it did not come into operation until 1913,
only to be suspended on the outbreak of war.
A 1920 Order to prevent farmers presenting cows
that had recently aborted for sale in markets proved
unenforceable due to the difficulty in identifying
them [2,14,21,22].
This period, therefore, saw little real progress in
state-led livestock disease control. Nevertheless, the
SVD’s activities had long-term consequences. The
discovery of diagnostic tests for bTB and brucellosis
laid the groundwork for their control and elimination
later in the century. SVD research led to the 1905
foundation of a dedicated state veterinary laboratory,
which still exists today as part of the Veterinary Lab-
oratories Agency [23]. It also enabled state vets to
wrest control over policy from lay officials. Their
claims that policy making and execution required a
scientific understanding of disease were recognized
in 1919, when they were awarded control of a new
Diseases of Animals division within the newly
founded Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(MAF) [11].
3. DEPRESSION AND DECLINE, 1920–1939
During the inter-war years, agriculture and the world
economy sank into depression. Prices for agricultural
produce slumped during the early 1920s then steadied
before falling again after the 1929 Wall Street crash. By
June 1933, they had dropped to pre-WWI levels [16].
This situation impacted on animal health and public
policy. Another important shaping factor was the
consumer politics of milk. Official recognition of its
nutritional qualities during WWI had been accom-
panied by campaigns for higher standards of milk
hygiene [24]. bTB was an important contaminant of
milk. An estimated 40 per cent of dairy herds were
infected, and it killed around 3000 people each year
[25]. Consequently, its control became a politically
pressing affair.
In 1925, MAF reinstated the 1913 Tuberculosis
Order. This enabled local authorities to slaughter,
with payment of compensation, cows with bTB
symptoms or which produced tuberculous milk. Its
implementation caused local authorities to appoint
increasing numbers of full and part-time veterinary
inspectors. By 1937, around one-third of all vets
were so employed, gaining valuable income at a time
when horse numbers were in decline and agriculture
in depression [21]. The Order may have had some
public health benefits in causing the slaughter of sev-
eral thousand infected cows each year. Nevertheless,
it was widely perceived as an inefficient method [26].
Consumer groups and many doctors voiced grow-
ing support for milk pasteurization as a means of
protecting the public from bTB and other milk con-
taminants. MAF officials argued that pasteurization
was unreliable: it could not make dirty milk clean; it
imposed excessive costs on the producer; and it
damaged the nutritional composition of milk. A far
better approach was to improve the public’s health
indirectly, by tackling bTB in cows. However, owing
to financial stringency, they were unable to meet the
demands of the National Veterinary Medical Associ-
ation (NVMA), forerunner of the British Veterinary
Association (BVA), for a nationwide programme of
bTB eradication [17,24–27].
In 1933–1934, bTB policy was considered by a
cattle disease committee of the Economic Advisory
Council (EAC), chaired by Frederick Gowland
Hopkins, president of the Royal Society. Its recom-
mendations caused MAF to introduce in 1935 an
attested herds scheme linked to a system of milk grad-
ing. To gain attested (i.e. bTB-free) status, and the
accompanying 1 penny bonus per gallon of milk,
herds had to pass three consecutive tuberculin tests,
the last of which was a free, official test. The owner
had to agree to a number of rules to prevent bTB re-
introduction, and the herd’s status was checked at
Farm animal disease and public policy A. Woods 1945
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intervals by repeat testing. The scheme was not popu-
lar. The low bonus offered, consumer confusion about
milk grading, farmers’ distrust of the state, and the
unreliability of tuberculin meant that by 1938, only 3
per cent of herds had achieved attested status
[2,17,25,27].
The EAC’s report also confirmed and publicized an
impression, held by many vets and farmers, of a gen-
eral decline in dairy cow health. Drawing on the
results of surveys performed by agricultural research
institutes, it revealed that the average dairy cow
remained in the herd for only half of her useful life.
Fifty-eight per cent of cows were disposed of due to
brucellosis, infertility, mastitis, bTB and Johne’s dis-
ease, at a cost to farmers of £2.5 million a year.
Brucellosis, like bTB, was present in over 40 per
cent of herds, which experienced an average annual
abortion rate of 9 per cent [25].
The poor state of dairy cow health can be partly
attributed to the agricultural depression and the
state’s attempt to counter its detrimental impacts
through the 1931 Agricultural Marketing Act. Under
the terms of the Act, milk producers combined in
1933 to form a Milk Marketing Board (MMB). This
sold milk and negotiated prices on their behalf. It
was also responsible for the system of milk grading
through which tuberculin testing was promoted (see
above). The stability it created attracted many new
converts to dairying, which was already proving popu-
lar on account of its immunity to foreign competition
[28].4 A lack of land, buildings or labour was no impe-
diment. Many dairy farmers kept flying herds,
maintained by the purchase of freshly calved cows,
which they fed on purchased feed and sold when
their milk output dropped [29]. Some adopted
machine milking which required less labour than tra-
ditional hand milking. However, milking machines
encouraged mastitis [30], while the frequent sale and
purchase of cows facilitated the spread of brucellosis
and bTB [31]. In reducing milk output, disease threa-
tened producers’ contractual agreements to supply
dairies with a set quantity of milk. With little faith
in—or money to pay for—private veterinary aid, they
responded by slaughtering or selling sick animals and
replacing them with new ones, so contributing to the
spread of disease. While aware of these practices and
the diseases which resulted, the state made little
attempt to intervene [19].
The 1933 formation of a Bacon Marketing Board—
which paid farmers a ‘fair’ price, agreed in advance, and
based on the estimated, average cost of production—
had a similar impact on the health of pigs. Farmers
with a below-average cost of production could poten-
tially make high profits. Prices for cereal-based pig
feed had already plummeted on account of the
depression, while the growth of the dairy industry pro-
vided another cheap foodstuff: skimmed milk. These
factors encouraged a move to specialist pig production,
in which large numbers of pigs were housed together in
specially erected, Danish-style fattening houses [32].5
Their owners, and vets responsible for inspecting pig
carcasses in meat factories, observed that under such
conditions, pigs sufferedmore frequently from respirat-
ory and gastrointestinal disease. Again, the state—and
most practising vets—took little interest, confining
their interventions in pig health to swine fever, which
remained endemic [33–35].
While no marketing board was established for
sheep, the depression took its toll on their health. As
prices dropped, hill farmers tried to save money by
reduced shepherding, less active pasture management,
and retaining sheep on the same pastures over winter
instead of paying for their keep on lower lying farms.
They also neglected their statutory duties to dip
sheep against scab. The result was under-nutrition
and deficiency diseases, tick-borne, parasitic and bac-
terial disease, unobserved deaths from unknown
causes, and poor lamb survival [2,36].
The inter-war years were, therefore, characterized
by a general decline in livestock health, and a failure
of bTB policy. Just before World War II (WWII), how-
ever, the state adopted a more active animal health
policy. Faced with looming hostilities and the need
to plan for food production in wartime, it proposed,
under the 1937 Agriculture Act, a large-scale cam-
paign to eradicate diseases, such as bTB, brucellosis,
Johne’s and mastitis, with resources directed to bTB
in the first instance. To perform this task, it brought
together the full and part-time veterinary inspectors
attached to central and local government to form a
single, centralized State Veterinary Service (SVS).
Reflecting the shift in policy emphasis, MAF’s Dis-
eases of Animals division was renamed the Animal
Health division (AHD). In 1938, it introduced a
more popular bTB-attested herds scheme with
improved market incentives. It also planned to insti-
tute national brucellosis testing in 1939–1940
[2,21,37,38]. This plan, together with the Agricultural
Research Council’s (ARC) establishment of a field
station at Compton for brucellosis vaccine research
[39], represented a long over-due response to the
1928 identification of a link between brucellosis and
undulant fever in humans [40]. However, all initiatives
were disrupted by the outbreak of war.
4. ENHANCING THE FOOD SUPPLY
IN WARTIME, 1939–1945
The ways in which the state perceived and responded to
livestock disease changed markedly during WWII.
These changes were precipitated by a broader reorienta-
tion of agricultural and food policy. In wartime, Britain
could no longer maintain its heavy, inter-war reliance
upon imported food, fertilizer and livestock feed. To
secure the feeding of the nation, the state took charge
of food production and distribution. It introduced fixed
prices for farming produce—which significantly elevated
farmers’ incomes—and rationing for consumers. Farm-
ers were instructed by members of state-appointed
County War Agricultural Executive Committees on the
types and quantities of food they should produce, and
the best methods of doing so [41–44]. The resulting,
often dramatic changes in farming systems had impor-
tant implications for animal health.
Specialist pig production was undermined by the
need to preserve cereals for human consumption. Pig
numbers dropped by 65 per cent as the scale of pro-
duction shrank and shifted to mixed farms and urban
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back-yards, where pigs were fed on farming by-products
and swill, respectively. The respiratory and gastro-
intestinal diseases of intensive pig production gave way
to digestive complaints. Meanwhile, the inclusion of
uncooked, infectedmeat scraps in swill led to an increase
in swine fever and FMD, which were tackled by the
1942 establishment of swill-boiling plants run by the
government’s Waste Food Board [10,44–46].
Dairy farming was actively encouraged by the state.
Thiswasbecausenutrition experts definedmilk as a ‘pro-
tective food’ essential for health. It could also act as a
protein substitute for foreign meat, butter and cheese
[28,47]. However, much of the grassland used to feed
cows was ploughed up to grow crops for human
consumption, and imported, manufactured feed was in
short supply. Therefore, farmers had to grow their
own fodder crops. The change in diet caused milk
production to fall. Although dairy cow numbers were
actually increasing, by 1941–1942, production stood at
88 per cent of pre-war levels [43,44].6
One way of improving milk output was to tackle dis-
ease. However, MAF’s planned pre-war campaigns
against bTB and brucellosis could not be implemented
owing to shortages of manpower and laboratory equip-
ment. In November 1940, the NVMA proposed a
quite different course of action. Its leading members
had carried out a survey which showed that brucello-
sis, infertility, mastitis and Johne’s (the four diseases
pinpointed by the EAC’s earlier report) were jointly
responsible for losses of £17 million or 200 million
gallons of milk each year. They argued that vets were
quite capable of managing these diseases and enhan-
cing the milk supply. However, they rarely had an
opportunity to do so because farmers typically slaugh-
tered or sold affected cows, or treated them with
home-made or patent remedies. To overcome this pro-
blem, they proposed a ‘Scheme for the control of
certain diseases of dairy cattle’, commonly known as
the ‘survey’ or ‘panel’ scheme [19].
Under the scheme, farmers paid a flat fee in return
for quarterly visits by practising vets, at which herd
health and reproductive status were assessed, advice
offered and designated treatments performed. The
NVMA asked MAF to provide publicity, subsidized
brucellosis vaccines (the new S19 vaccine, recently
developed in the USA) and free sulphonamides for
mastitis treatment. Although initially reluctant, war-
time pressures forced MAF to agree to the NVMA’s
proposals. The National Farmers Union (NFU) also
pledged its support. The scheme was introduced on a
voluntary basis inMay 1942.Uptake peaked inFebruary
1945 then declined until 1951 when it was termin-
ated. Brucellosis vaccination proved so successful that
MAF introduced its own subsidized calf vaccination
scheme in 1944. The same year, it reopened its attested
herds scheme [19].
The NVMA drew up a similar scheme for the control
of sheep diseases, but thiswas not implemented. Instead,
MAF took charge. Actionwas clearly needed. The fixing
of wool prices by theMinistry of Supply to aid themanu-
facture of military uniforms had further undermined
the hill sheep farming economy.A compensatory subsidy
for hill ewes, introduced in 1940, saved many farmers
from bankruptcy, but caused a further decline in sheep
health by encouraging overstocking. Vaccines against
the major infectious diseases, notably clostridial diseases
and louping ill, had been available for years, but were
rarely used as farmers tended to accept disease losses or
apply their own traditional remedies [36,44,47].
In the first year of the war, MAF tried to draw up a
scheme for supplying cheap vaccines and sera to hill
sheep farmers via veterinary investigation officers.
Part of the SVS and stationed in regional centres, these
officers offered a free diagnostic service to farmers, and
provided technical advice via private vets. The plan foun-
dered due to the resistance of private vets and drug
companies [48]. In the summer of 1942,MAF seconded
15of its regular veterinary staff tohill sheep farming areas
to survey disease problems and advise on their resolution
and prevention. This initiative was more successful. By
the end of the war, officers reported that sheep farmers
had become disease conscious. Realizing that losses
were not inevitable, they had begun to consult vets
when disease occurred, and to make greater use of
vaccines and sheep dips [49]. The latter contributed to
the elimination of sheep scab from Britain in 1952 [2].
Thus, in hill sheep farming as in dairying, war
caused farmers, vets and the state to identify, problem-
atize and tackle jointly a range of specific diseases
whose prevalence threatened the nation’s capacity to
feed itself. Formerly disregarded or viewed as private
farming concerns, these conditions were transformed
into public problems that required state-supported
veterinary intervention. The interventions adopted
were very different from the state’s pre-war campaigns
against disease. They involved new organizational
structures—the private/public partnership of the
dairy cow scheme, and advisory services to hill sheep
farms—and had new ends in view: the education of
farmers, and to prevent as well as resolve disease at
the herd level. These developments provided an
important foundation for post-war initiatives. They
also enabled the veterinary profession to build a
closer relationship with farmers and the state, and to
develop its expertise and reputation as ‘physician of
the farm’ [19].
5. THE PREVENTION AND ERADICATION
OF DISEASE, 1945–1980
The 35 years after WWII were the heyday of state
veterinary activity. This activity was made both poss-
ible and desirable by a more general state-led drive,
under the 1947 and 1957 Agriculture Acts, to increase
the quantity and efficiency of food production. Motiv-
ated by the post-war global food shortage, and the
need to minimize imports in order to preserve scarce
sterling supplies [44,50], this expansionist agricultural
policy maintained the wartime practice of subsidizing
production.7 The resulting shift to more intensive farm-
ing methods had paradoxical consequences for animal
health. On the one hand, it accelerated the wartime
trend of viewing disease as a significant impediment to
production, and drove new attempts to research, control
and prevent it. At the same time, novel farming
methods—adopted in an attempt to increase pro-
ductivity—provided new opportunities for disease to
emerge and spread. The demographics of disease were
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therefore changing at a time when disease was perceived
as a greater problem than ever before.
The implications for MAF’s AHD were twofold.
Firstly, at a national level, it was finally able to intro-
duce schemes for the eradication of the major
endemic diseases: bTB, swine fever and brucellosis.
Although the pasteurization of milk, made compulsory
in 1949 (except for farmers selling milk direct to the
public), had removed the major public health risks
posed by bTB and brucellosis, their effects on agricul-
tural productivity were thought sufficiently serious to
merit large-scale, expensive eradication campaigns
[26]. Secondly, at farm level, it worked in conjunction
with the veterinary profession (and to a lesser extent,
the NFU) to develop new ways of promoting herd
health and productivity through the application of
veterinary preventive medicine.8
MAF’s disease eradication campaigns built on the
foundations established earlier in the century. Sub-
sequent research had resulted in more reliable
tuberculin, improved methods of diagnosing and vacci-
nating against brucellosis, and a new vaccine against
swine fever. These technologies were used to reduce dis-
ease incidence to a level at which stamping out appeared
feasible. The bTB campaign began in 1950 with an area
eradication plan. By then, 22 per cent of the nation’s
cattle were enrolled in the attested herds scheme. Over
the next decade, areas containing high percentages of
attested cattle were successively identified as ‘attested
areas’ and subjected to compulsory tuberculin testing
and slaughter of infected cattle. The whole country
became attested in 1960, at a total cost of £250 million.
Eradication was optimistically predicted. Attention then
turned to swine fever. Crystal violet vaccine had been
available since 1947 and its application subsidized
since 1953 under a swine fever registered vaccinated
herds scheme. In 1963, with disease at a relatively low
ebb, MAFF reinstated stamping out. Progress was
extremely rapid. Vaccination was banned in 1964, and
in 1967 the disease was eradicated [2,51].
Brucellosis was the next target. Following a long
period of disease control under the state-subsidized calf
vaccination scheme, MAFF introduced in 1967 an
accredited herds scheme similar to that applied to bTB,
with vaccination phased out in attested areas. However,
because there was no requirement to slaughter reactors,
they frequently endedupon the openmarket.The result-
ing spread of infection was compounded in 1967–1968
by the large-scale purchase of dairy cows by Cheshire
farmers, who had lost their stock to one of the most
devastating FMD epidemics on record. Problems were
also encountered in vaccination and diagnosis: disease
sometimes appeared in immunized herds, while diagno-
sis threw up a number of false positives. It was not until
the 1970s, with the introduction of an additional
(45/20) vaccine, new testing regimes (involving three
different diagnostic tests), the brucellosis incentives
scheme (which rewarded farmers for clearing their
herds of disease), and a law to ban the sale of reactors,
that infection levels dropped to a point at which eradica-
tion became possible. From 1971, this proceeded in the
same manner as bTB. A decade later, the whole country
was declared attested ([10,52];G.Davies 2007, personal
observations).
These policies were executed by SVS’s full-time
officers and by private vets, who were employed part-
time by the SVS to act as local veterinary inspectors
(LVIs). MAFF payments to LVIs increased fivefold
between 1945 and 1962. Consequently, many veterin-
ary practices became heavily reliant on state work,
using it to subsidize their private services to farmers.
Such services were in demand in the immediate post-
war period owing to high farming subsidies, livestock
values, and the development of powerful new anti-
biotic and anti-helminthic drugs.9 Able to make an
ample living from LVI work, drug sales and the treat-
ment of individual sick animals, the growing body of
private vets dispensed with the preventive approach
of the wartime survey scheme [19,54,55].
By the early 1960s, however, BVA leaders had
begun to reevaluate the need for preventive veterinary
medicine and to lobby the state to facilitate its provi-
sion on farms. They felt that the future of veterinary
practice, in its existing form, was uncertain: LVI
work would diminish as bTB and swine fever eradica-
tion progressed, while private work was threatened by
cuts in agricultural subsidies which caused farmers to
reduce their veterinary spending. At the same time,
structural changes in the farming industry were
impacting on animal health [54,56,57]. Farmers in
search of efficiency savings were developing larger,
more specialist enterprises and adopting new husband-
ry methods. These changes sometimes enhanced
health but more usually encouraged the emergence
and spread of disease. Higher stocking densities on
improved pastures increased the build-up of worms
in grazing animals; large, indoor pig herds suffered
severe respiratory and gastrointestinal disease; dairy
cows on ley pastures10 suffered metabolic diseases
like bloat and ketosis; leys were also implicated in
infertility, as was genetic selection for enhanced milk
production, achieved through artificial insemination,
a new technology encouraged and initially controlled
by MAFF. Milking machines facilitated the spread of
mastitis,11 and disease outbreaks—most notably sal-
monellosis—followed the mingling and long-distance
transport of calves [60–64].
These conditions were labelled ‘diseases of pro-
duction’. They often had low mortality and relatively
mild clinical signs, but at herd or flock level, caused sig-
nificant losses in productive capacity by reducing
growth rates, fertility and milk production [65]. Their
increasing incidence and costly impacts were made vis-
ible firstly, by a series of national and regional disease
surveys, begun by the BVA and taken over by MAFF
[66]; secondly, by the development of farm accounting
and methods of assessing the cost of particular diseases
[67–69]; thirdly, by the diagnostic work and disease sur-
veillance performed by an expanding Veterinary
Investigation Service [2,70];12 fourthly, by the close
monitoring within intensive systems, of production
parameters, such as growth rate, food conversion effi-
ciency and fertility [71]; and finally by a growing body
of research into livestock disease funded by MAFF, the
ARC, the Pig Industry Development Agency (Pida),13
and drug and feed companies [72–74].
The diseases of production were increasingly prob-
lematized following the 1957 Agriculture Act, which
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reduced farming subsidies in order to encourage more
efficient production [65]. Many had complex aetiolo-
gies, and could not be controlled by the growing
range of pharmaceutical products.14 Consequently,
BVA leaders argued that efforts should focus on
disease prevention, with attention directed to the var-
ious factors (husbandry, nutrition, housing, breeding,
purchasing and marketing, stockmanship) that influ-
enced disease emergence and spread. Pointing to the
National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS)—
which had promoted farming efficiency since 1946
by offering free, expert advice to farmers in all fields
except livestock health [76]—they argued that the
state should subsidize vets to provide farmers with
advice on disease prevention [56,57].
On account of its remit to improve agricultural effi-
ciency, MAFF initially proved receptive to this
demand. It also saw the development of a preventive
medicine service as a means of gaining leverage over
the NFU in the annual price review discussions, and
employment for its veterinary officerswhen disease eradi-
cation campaigns ended [77]. In the early 1960s, it
conducted an internal enquiry into the formation of a
national health service for animals, which would offer
free preventive medicine service to farmers [78,79].
Although it ultimately declined to form such a service,
it committed itself in a 1965 white paper, ‘to think of
redeploying our veterinary resources so as to concentrate
more on preventive medicine to reduce the incidence of
disease in general’ [80].
As a first step, the SVS established joint regional
study groups with the BVA and NFU, to plan and
implement local educational initiatives. These ran,
with varying degrees of success, until 1972 [81,82].
It also started a pig health scheme in 1968, which pro-
vided elite breeding herds with four free veterinary
visits a year (two by state vets and two by private
vets) at which health was monitored and advice offered
on improving herd health status [77,83,84]. However,
MAFF’s tentative plans to pay practising vets to visit
farms regularly and advise on disease prevention
were curtailed by the economic crisis of the late
1960s [77]. It proved difficult to assess—as the Treas-
ury now demanded—the costs and benefits of this
‘whole farm’ veterinary advice. A pilot exercise,
conducted on 140 farms in conjunction with NAAS
and the BVA, gave inconclusive results [85]. MAFF
therefore declined to organize or to fund further
substantial preventive medicine initiatives, even when
recommended to do so by the committee it had
appointed to consider the future role of the veterinary
profession [86,87].
Consequently, the management of the diseases of
production remained largely in the private domain.
Practising vets tended to focus narrowly upon infectious
disease control rather than applying the ‘whole farm’
approach advocated by BVA leaders. They used the
Veterinary Investigation Centre’s diagnostic services,
newly developed vaccines and antibiotics to control
and eliminate disease from herds and flocks. To main-
tain disease-freedom, they advocated biosecurity and
the use of disease-free animals, most notably specific
pathogen free pigs which were adopted by the growing
number of pig breeding companies [65,74,88].
Together with the SVS’s disease elimination campaigns
and preventive medicine initiatives, these interventions
proved successful in improving the health and pro-
ductivity of livestock, so enabling farmers to increase
their efficiency and income, and to further intensify
their production practices. Vets therefore made an
important contribution to the highly successful post-
war food production campaign [59,89].15
6. ROLLING BACK THE STATE, 1980–2000
In 1973, Britain joined the European Community (EC)
and became subject to its Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Membership initially enabled the government
to maintain its post-war commitment to agricultural
protection and expansion.16 The CAP subsidized agri-
culture in member countries, and absorbed two-thirds
of the EC’s budget. The British government saw the
expansion of British food production as one way of off-
setting the costs of membership. Farmers needed little
encouragement to produce. Faced with rising prices
for agricultural inputs, most notably labour, they con-
tinued to seek economies of scale.17 By 1980, food
production was in surplus and criticisms were growing
of the cost of agricultural support, and its damaging
effects on the environment and animal welfare. These
criticisms disrupted the post-war consensus that agri-
cultural expansion was in the national interest, and
encouraged the growth of a so-called ‘post-productivist’
outlook involving more sustainable farming systems
[44,90–92].18
These developments, and the policy responses to
them, had important implications for animal health. A
small, organic sector emerged, whose emphasis on
‘natural’ methods of livestock production and restric-
tions on the routine use of veterinary pharmaceuticals
resulted in new challenges to animal health [93]. In
contrast, the countervailing, still dominant trend to agri-
cultural intensification involved heavy reliance on
veterinary interventions. As described above, these
interventions enabled farmers to increase the intensity
of production by reducing the threat and impacts of
certain diseases. In so doing, they contributed to the cre-
ation of conditions that favoured the further emergence
and spread of disease. Consequently, many production
diseases (most notably mastitis and infertility) remained
significant problems in intensive systems, not because
vets and farmers had neglected them, but because
their effective management of some contributing
factors was counterbalanced by the emergence of new
ones [94,95].
While MAFF took little interest in these diseases, it
was forced to assume control of another condition that
arose through attempts to achievemaximumproduction
at lowest cost. BSE or mad cow disease was an obscure,
neurological and ultimately fatal condition first recog-
nized by MAFF in 1986. It was eventually traced to
the inclusion in cattle feed of meat and bonemeal
derived from the carcasses of infected cattle. In 1988,
this feed was banned, and a slaughter policy introduced
for infected cattle. By 1992, when the epidemic peaked,
nearly 60 000 cases had been confirmed in 18 500
herds. Despite MAFF’s continuing assurance that
BSE presented no risk to the public’s health, it was
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forced to acknowledge in 1996 a link between contamin-
ated beef consumption and the emergence of variant
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in humans. This event
damaged public confidence in food safety and under-
mined the food industry and British agriculture—
which faced a decade-long ban on beef exports. In
addition, the government’s lack of transparency, its
handling of the scientific uncertainty that had sur-
rounded BSE aetiology, and MAFF’s promotion of the
interests of farmers over the public interest severely
damaged public trust in policy making [96,97].
Meanwhile, a Conservative government intent on
rolling back the state had come to power. In the light
of food surpluses and the cost of the CAP, it
announced in 1980 that it would no longer pay for
the eradication of newly recognized livestock diseases.
While it was forced to revise this stance in relation to
BSE, pig producers had to fund, via a levy, the eradi-
cation of Aujeszky’s disease, which appeared in 1979
[98]. New voluntary attested herds schemes, set up in
1982 for enzootic bovine leukosis (made notifiable in
1977) and maedi-visna in sheep (a non-notifiable dis-
ease), continued to offer free diagnostic testing.
However, reactors had to be slaughtered without
compensation [99]. In 1987, these diseases were incor-
porated into voluntary cattle and sheep health schemes
covering a range of infectious diseases. Participating
farmers had to contribute to the costs of these and
the pre-existing pig health scheme [100].
A 1994 review of the SVS by Andy Lebrecht, prin-
cipal private secretary to the Minister of Agriculture,
argued that the health schemes were peripheral to
MAFF’s policy concerns and did not merit an
annual £1.5 million government subsidy. They were
subsequently privatized. This event brought to a
close the state’s post-war involvement in farm-level
veterinary preventive medicine and heralded a new
era in which it expected the agricultural industry to
play a more active role in promoting animal health
[100–102].
Owing to the high costs and strict protocols
involved, few commercial cattle and sheep herds
enrolled in the newly privatized health schemes. The
pig industry, dominated by a handful of breeding com-
panies keen to ensure the health of their stocks, proved
more active. From the early 1990s, a more general
stimulus to preventive healthcare was provided by the
industry- and retailer-led development of farm assur-
ance schemes. Devised in an attempt to restore
consumer confidence in the wake of the BSE crisis,
these required participating farmers to have a health
plan. However, most plans were extremely conserva-
tive. Focusing on vaccination, medicine use and
biosecurity protocols, they were ‘tick box exercises’
that did not necessarily require veterinary input and
paid little heed to the animal health and welfare
outcomes [103,104].
Lebrecht’s 1994 review recognized the importance
of MAFF’s traditional role in the control and elimin-
ation of infectious diseases of national significance.
These included bTB, whose steadily rising incidence
was attributed to the existence of a wildlife reservoir
in badgers [105]. However, owing to the decline in
epizootic disease incidence (FMD had caused only
one, minor outbreak since the 1967–1968 epidemic)
he rejected the notion that veterinary staffing levels
should be kept at levels adequate to cope with disease
emergencies [101]. His recommendations resulted in
additional cuts to an already contracting SVS, and the
closure of several regional centres. Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment lowered funding for agricultural and veterinary
research, reduced the size of the Veterinary Investigation
Service, and—in pursuit of efficiency savings—turned it
and the Central Veterinary Laboratory into arms-length
agencies [106,107].19
Concurrent efforts to harmonize trade within the
EU, and to reform the CAP by reducing international
trading barriers led to an increase in the scale and fre-
quency of international livestock movements,20 and
the reappearance of FMD in several countries that
were formerly free of the disease [10,91]. In the late
1990s, partly as a result of the BSE crisis and the
growing power of the supermarkets to drive down
farm gate prices, farmers’ incomes declined. This led
to further increases in farm size and livestock density,
the reduced employment of private vets, and increased
movement of livestock to maximize subsidy income
[10,44,91,106]. These various developments contrib-
uted, at the turn of the twenty-first century, to the
re-emergence of epizootic disease as a significant
threat to the health of British livestock.
In 2000, swine fever broke out in Britain for only the
third time since its eradication in 1966. Sixteen farms in
East Anglia were infected. More than 50 000 pigs were
destroyed and exports banned, at a cost of £100 million
to the industry. The SVS had to divert 80 per cent of its
capacity to the management of this disease. When, the
following year, FMD reappeared causing hundreds of
outbreaks nationwide, SVS resources proved hopelessly
inadequate. MAFF’s ignorance of the scale of livestock
movements, the distancing of laboratory scientists from
field officers, the loss of local knowledge and corporate
memory in the SVS, and farmers’ tendency to manage
ailments themselves instead of seeking veterinary aid,
impeded efforts to trace and contain the rapid, extensive
spread of virus. By the time FMD was eliminated, in
September 2001, by a vigorous and highly contested
policy of extended slaughter, an estimated 10 million
livestock had lost their lives. Exports of meat and live-
stock did not resume until the following year [10,106].
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has analysed the changing nature and
objectives of animal health policy in twentieth century
Britain, together with its drivers and impacts. It reveals
a trend, from 1900–1980, of expanding state interven-
tion, in which existing policy concerns were retained,
new ones adopted and the responses to them augment-
ed over time. While epizootic disease control was
no longer as central to state veterinary activities as it
had been in the nineteenth century, repeated invasions
of FMDmeant that it remained on the agenda. During
the Edwardian and inter-war periods the state
began to recognize and take steps to mitigate the
animal and public health implications of brucellosis
and bTB, but did not make substantial progress until
the post-war era, when it instituted nationwide
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eradication programmes. With the wartime and post-
war campaigns for greater and more efficient food
production, it expanded its remit to include the
farm-level control and prevention of specific diseases
and the so-called diseases of production. This multiple
layering of animal health policy was disrupted during
the last 20 years of the century. Eradication schemes
were practically complete; the perceived threat of
epizootic disease reduced with the disappearance of
FMD; and re-evaluations of the role of agriculture
and its relationship to the state led to an increasing
emphasis on industry responsibility for diseases of
production and future eradication schemes.
The shifting focus of animal health policy was partly
due to a change in disease demographics, which was
itself partly precipitated by public policy. This paper
has shown how the inter-war marketing boards, the
post-war food production drive and the successful inter-
ventions of the SVS led to changes to farming practice
that sometimes favoured the emergence and spread of
disease. This led, in turn, to new (public and private)
forms of veterinary intervention. The late twentieth cen-
tury Conservative government’s policy of reducing state
support for agriculture and the size of SVS also had
implications for livestock health. The intention is not
to criticize these policies, or to claim that they were
the only factor to influence livestock health, but rather
to highlight the co-production of animal health, farming
practice and public policy.
However, disease demographics were not the whole
story. The emergence and spread of a particular dis-
ease did not necessarily make it a focus of policy
concern. First, surveillance mechanisms and scientific
insights were required to make disease, its incidence
and impacts visible. Secondly, those impacts had to
be problematized, and thirdly, the state had to
assume responsibility for them. As shown in this
paper, these processes were influenced by factors
such as the national and livestock economy, agricul-
tural policy, veterinary interests and expertise, public
health concerns, food security and consumer politics.
Scientific and technical progress, while important,
can offer only a partial explanation for the historic
evolution of farm animal health and public policy.
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ENDNOTES
1The Veterinary Department was formed as the Cattle Plague
department in 1865 and placed under the Privy Council. It was
transferred to a new Agricultural Department in 1883 which
became the Board of Agriculture in 1889. The MAF was formed
in 1919, and became the MAFF in 1956. MAFF was replaced by
the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra) in 2001 [5].
2An epizootic is the animal equivalent of a human epidemic.
3The number of cows in calf or in milk increased by 18.6
per cent between 1871–1875 and 1896–1900, and by 31.6 per
cent between 1871–1875 and 1911–1915. The development of
rail transport opened up new markets for milk at a time when
arable farming faced severe competition from North American
imports [16].
4The numbers of milking cows in the UK rose from 2 953 000 in
1930 to 3 321 000 in 1939 [29].
5Pig numbers in the UK rose from 3.2 million in 1931 to 4.6 million
in 1936 [29].
6UK dairy cow numbers increased by 76 000 between 1939 and
1942 [29].
7Under the 1947 Act, the state maintained its commitment to a
stable and productive agriculture. To encourage farmers to invest
in high cost items, such as new buildings and machinery, the war-
time system of set prices was continued until decontrol in 1953. It
was then replaced by a system of guaranteed prices. When market
prices fell below the guaranteed price, the state made up the differ-
ence. Prices were set annually in consultation with the NFU. The
1957 Act aimed for more efficient production by offering long-
term assurances of support while allowing gradual reductions in its
value. This strategy, known as the ‘cost price squeeze’, meant that
subsidies no longer fully compensated farmers for their increased
costs, so forcing them to make efficiency savings. Other forms of
farming support included subsidies on capital and chemical inputs,
a free NAAS, and—from the 1960s—grants to amalgamate small
farms and to encourage small farmers to leave the industry. As a con-
sequence, the number of agricultural holdings fell from 296 000 in
1950 to 168 000 in 1980, while their average size increased from
34 to 58 ha [44].
8Although the term ‘preventive medicine’ is sometimes used to refer
to the range of animal health interventions performed by the state,
this account uses the definition adopted by vets and policy makers
in the 1960s and 1970s. They viewed veterinary preventive medicine
as a veterinary-led, advice-based activity directed at improving herd
or flock health through attention to feeding, breeding, housing,
hygiene, stockmanship and disease control.
9Farmers’ incomes and the value of livestock doubled between 1950
and 1960. Livestock numbers also increased: cattle by 10 per cent,
sheep by 40 per cent and sows by 100 per cent [53].
10Leys were temporary pastures sown for grazing, hay or silage
making. They became popular in wartime, when farmers were
encouraged to plough up permanent pasture, and instead grow
crops and ley pasture in alternate years [58].
11The percentage of herds that were machine milked rose from
10 per cent in 1939 to 85 per cent in 1961 [59].
12The Veterinary Investigation Service was absorbed into MAF’s
AHD in 1946. Formerly, officers were attached to university depart-
ments of agriculture and agricultural colleges. Eight appointments
were made prior to WWII, two during WWII. Six additional centres
were established between 1950 and 1964 [2].
13Pida was formed in 1957 to promote the technical development of
the pig industry. It was subsumed into the Meat and Livestock
Commission in 1967 [73].
14Antibiotic resistance to livestock disease became apparent in the
1950s. Growing fears over its public health implications led MAFF
to appoint a Committee of Enquiry into the use of antibiotics in
animal husbandry and veterinary medicine. Chaired by Prof.
Swann of Bristol University, it reported in 1969 [75].
15Agricultural output grew more rapidly 1945–1965 than in any
period before or since [59].
16However, the CAP changed the mechanism of support, so that
costs were borne largely by the consumer instead of the taxpayer
[44].
17For example, milk production rose from 12 648 million litres in
1970 to over 16 000 million litres in 1984, when quotas were intro-
duced to prevent further expansion in output. Over the same period,
pig numbers remained fairly static. However, sheep numbers rose
from 26.1 million in 1970 to 41 million in 1988 [29].
18The term post-productivism encompasses the change in atti-
tudes towards production-oriented agriculture, the belief that the
countryside has purposes other than food production, and the
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accompanying changes to farming practices and policies. It is a
contested concept.
19The ARC was transformed into the Agriculture and Food
Research Council in 1983. It was replaced by the Biotechnology
and Biological Sciences Research Council in 1993. Between 1981/
1982 and 1987/1988, ARC funding fell by 23 per cent as a result
of the government’s belief that it should not fund near-market
research [107].
20Total livestock exports from the UK rose from just under 950 000 in
1976–1980 toover 1.5million in1991–1995.Thefigure then declined
on account of the beef export ban and 2001 FMD epidemic [20].
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